Somali Piracy is Back 2025: PAG Launches Long-Range Attacks
- Palaemon Maritime
- 5 hours ago
- 6 min read
Somali piracy has re-emerged in 2025: A series of coordinated attacks now stretches hundreds of miles offshore, reviving fears of a global shipping crisis.
After more than a decade of relative calm, the western Indian Ocean is once again confronting a revived piracy threat. According to Dryad Global, corroborated by UKMTO, MSCHOA, and multiple maritime intelligence sources, the resurgence began in late October 2025 with the mobilisation of Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) using hijacked dhows as motherships. These motherships now allow pirates to project force 300–600 nautical miles offshore. This resurgence has unfolded through a sequence of attacks and attempted boardings between 28 October and 7 November, including those involving SPAR Apus, Stolt Sagaland, Hellas Aphrodite, and Al-Thumama.
Collectively, they reveal a structured campaign by Somali networks capable of long-range coordination and sustained operations across the Somali Basin.
Read the article to get the latest analytical insights and strategic implications for maritime operators, insurers, and security stakeholders navigating the renewed piracy threat in the western Indian Ocean.
The Timeline of Attacks
28 October 2025 – Dhow Interceptions South of Eyl
Somali authorities intercepted two erratically behaving dhows south of Eyl, consistent with pre-operational mobilisation. Intelligence later linked one of these vessels to the Iranian-flagged Issa Mohhamdi, subsequently identified as the mothership in multiple attacks.
2 November 2025 – Approach to MV SPAR Apus
The Norway-flagged bulk carrier SPAR Apus reported being approached by an AIS-disabled vessel about 446 nm southeast of Mogadishu. Evasive manoeuvres deterred the approach. The event, though non-violent, marked the first evidence of PAG activity at range.
2 November 2025 – Attack on Stolt Sagaland
Hours later, the Cayman-registered chemical tanker Stolt Sagaland was fired upon 332 nm east of Mogadishu. Four armed attackers launched from a mother vessel, opening fire before being repelled by the ship’s armed guards. The quick, coordinated crew response prevented casualties and confirmed the pirates’ return to tactics last seen during the 2008–2011 crisis.
6 November 2025 – Boarding of Hellas Aphrodite
The Maltese-flagged product tanker Hellas Aphrodite was attacked 550 nm off the Somali coast while en route from India to South Africa. The assailants, armed with small arms and RPGs, boarded from a skiff launched by Issa Mohhamdi. The crew followed citadel procedures, maintaining communication with EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta. Within 24 hours, the Spanish frigate ESPS Victoria secured the ship. All 24 crew were unharmed.
7 November 2025 – Attempted Hijacking of Al-Thumama
At roughly the same time, the LNG tanker Al-Thumama was approached 530 nm southeast of Eyl by a small craft launched from the same mother vessel. The crew successfully evaded capture. Intelligence later tied the Al-Thumama incident, and possibly others earlier in the month (including Intertuna Tres and Stolt Sagaland), to the same pirate cell.
Mothership Containment
Following the November attacks, EUNAVFOR and the Indian Navy launched a multi-day pursuit of the pirate-controlled dhow Issa Mohhamdi. By 9 November, combined forces had located and contained the vessel in the Indian Ocean. “The Pirate Action Group linked to recent incidents is being monitored closely by the Indian Navy and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and there is currently no threat from this group to merchant vessels,” the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO) stated. “Vessels are advised to maintain general awareness.”
However, the situation remains unresolved. According to Vanguard Tech, the pirates continue to hold the dhow’s crew of fishermen hostage, threatening harm if approached. While they pose no further risk to merchant shipping, they have refused to surrender. The group, active for at least a week before interception, came within hours of taking foreign-flag hostages before the intervention. The Hellas Aphrodite boarding and the attempted approach on Al-Thumama were their most aggressive operations, reflecting a campaign that mirrored the long-range tactics of the early 2010s, when Somali pirates reached as far east as India’s coastal waters.
Tactical and Operational Patterns
The 2025 resurgence reflects a disciplined replication of past methods with a few refinements:
Use of hijacked dhows as motherships: enabling operations far beyond Somali coastal waters.
Deployment of fast skiffs armed with RPGs and automatic weapons: for intimidation, pursuit, and boarding.
AIS suppression and false identification: complicating detection and delaying naval response.
Multiple simultaneous operations: maintaining constant pressure on merchant shipping and naval surveillance.
The reuse of the same mothership (Issa Mohhamdi) across all major incidents indicates some degree of centralised coordination rather than isolated opportunism, a sign of reconstituted command networks and renewed financing.
Drivers of Resurgence
Diverted Naval Focus
The redirection of warships to the Red Sea for counter-Houthi operations has thinned patrols across the Somali Basin. Pirates have exploited these gaps with predictable efficiency.
Financial Incentives
The USD 5 million ransom paid for the Abdullah’s release in April 2024 sent an unmistakable signal that hijack-for-ransom remains viable. In an environment of weak governance and high unemployment, piracy remains one of the few scalable income streams.
Illegal Fishing and Local Grievances
Foreign exploitation of Somali fisheries continues to fuel resentment. Some dhow seizures reportedly began as disputes over illegal fishing before escalating into organised piracy, blurring economic grievance and criminality.
Organised Crime and Militant Links
There is growing intelligence of cooperation between pirates, al-Shabaab, and Houthi intermediaries, suggesting pirates now serve as revenue and logistics auxiliaries for militant groups. This convergence of ideology, commerce, and criminality complicates any purely maritime solution.
Broader Security Environment
The Somali littoral remains a nexus for arms trafficking, fuel smuggling, and militia activity. The overlap of legitimate fishermen, traders, and armed actors raises the risk of misidentification and escalation at sea.
Strategic Implications for Maritime Security
The western Indian Ocean is now a contested operating environment, pressured from multiple directions:
Somali PAGs advancing eastward into open-ocean lanes;
Houthi forces disrupting traffic through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb;
Reduced naval coverage due to global reallocation of assets.
This convergence has created a dual maritime choke point, forcing operators to choose between risk in the north or detours around the Cape of Good Hope, an expensive and unsustainable trade-off. Additionally, the International Maritime Bureau recorded seven piracy incidents off Somalia in 2024, including three hijackings, compared with only one in 2023. The curve is steepening, not flattening.
Security Recommendations
From an operational and insurance standpoint, the renewed threat demands strict compliance and proactive mitigation. Maritime personnel are recommended to follow the listed measures:
1. Adherence to BMP5Shipowners must ensure comprehensive application of BMP in the High-Risk Area. Consider utilising razor wire, hardening, and ensure lookouts and citadel readiness. For high-end, personalized hardening protection for your vessel, visit Palaemon Maritime.
2. Voyage-Specific Threat Assessments:Routes through the western Indian Ocean should be planned using the latest intelligence bulletins from UKMTO, MSCHOA, and Dryad Global.
3. Transparent Reporting:All suspicious approaches must be promptly reported to ensure collective naval awareness and timely intervention. Operators should maintain regular contact with industry associations and naval task forces for updated threat forecasts.
4. Insurance Coverage:War risk and K&R policies must reflect the heightened threat environment. Non-compliance with BMP5 may jeopardise claim validity.
Contained But Not Concluded
The recent containment of the Issa Mohhamdi dhow by EUNAVFOR and the Indian Navy has temporarily neutralised the immediate threat, but the situation remains volatile. As of this writing, Operation Atalanta and Indian naval units continue monitoring the standoff.The episode demonstrates how quickly piracy networks can re-emerge when surveillance lapses and local conditions deteriorate.
Somali piracy has re-evolved into a complex hybrid of criminal, economic, and militant enterprise. The coordinated attacks from SPAR Apus to Hellas Aphrodite mark not a series of isolated events, but a concerted campaign probing the boundaries of maritime security. For the maritime industry, this resurgence is both a warning and a reminder that in the western Indian Ocean, calm seas rarely mean safety.
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