Red Sea Maritime Threat Assessment: Full Analysis of Magic Seas & Eternity C Attacks - Houthi Escalation, Casualty Reports & Industry Risk Framework

Palaemon Maritime
Jul 14
3 min read

July 6-7 coordinated attacks sink two bulk carriers, kill crew members, and kidnap survivors as Houthis expand targeting from current Israeli ties to historical port calls and suspected affiliations

Magic Seas was attacked in two phases, including with explosive unmanned surface vehicles (USVs)

Attack Details

The Magic Seas was targeted on July 6, roughly 51 nautical miles southwest of Hodeidah. The two-phase attack began with eight armed skiffs engaging the ship’s onboard Armed Security Team (AST). This was followed by four explosive unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), two of which struck the port side, breaching the hull and igniting fires. The vessel lost propulsion and began taking on water, forcing all 22 crew members to abandon ship. The coordination and complexity of the assault underscored the Houthis’ growing maritime capabilities.

Less than 24 hours later, the Eternity C was attacked under similar circumstances. Fast skiffs and multiple USVs surrounded the vessel. A rocket-propelled grenade disabled the bridge, knocking out communications, and an explosion in the engine room killed three crew members. Fires and flooding followed, severely damaging the ship. On July 8, Houthi boats returned to destroy the lifeboats, stranding the crew as the vessel sank. Six survivors were kidnapped; four crew members (three Filipinos and one Russian) were confirmed dead. By July 9, the ship was lost. The use of manned and unmanned systems, combined with extreme violence, marked a dramatic intensification of Houthi operations.

Vessel Backgrounds and Targeting Logic

Despite different destinations—Magic Seas to Turkey and Eternity C to Saudi Arabia—both vessels were Liberian-flagged and operated by Greek firms. The Magic Seas, built in 2016 and carrying fertilizers from Zhuhai, China, had no current Israeli ties. However, port data showed it had called at Ashdod, Israel, multiple times between 2020 and 2023. The Houthis cited this history to justify the attack, claiming the vessel violated their declared ban on entering “occupied Palestinian ports.”

The Eternity C, built in 2021 and managed by Cosmoship, had no confirmed Israeli links. However, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree claimed the ship was targeted for allegedly heading to Eilat. In reality, it was bound for Jeddah. This discrepancy raises significant concerns for global shippers, as the attack was based on suspected, rather than verified, affiliation.

The Expanding Risk Profile

Photo from private rescue operation of Eternity C crew members who were in the water for over 24 hours. (Picture Credit: Diaplous/Reuters)

These incidents reflect a shift in Houthi targeting from concrete to inferred or historical affiliations. Previously, the group focused on vessels with clear ties to Israeli ownership or destinations. Now, their criteria include past port calls, fleet associations, or even perceived intent. This strategy introduces deliberate ambiguity into their targeting framework, heightening fear and uncertainty among commercial operators.

The evolving Houthi risk framework is summarised below:

Type of Affiliation to Israel	Risk Level
Owned or operated by Israeli company	Very High
Flagged by Israel	Very High
Currently en route to Israeli port	Very High
Previous port call in Israel	High
Part of a fleet with vessels that called at Israeli ports	High
Suspected of heading to Israel (unconfirmed)	Moderate to High
Cargo linked to Israeli trade	Moderate
No clear connection; possibly misidentified	Low to Moderate

The implications are far-reaching: even ships with tenuous or outdated Israeli ties are now at risk. By lowering the threshold for what constitutes a "legitimate" target, the Houthis have widened the threat to a broader segment of global shipping, thus potentially ensnaring vessels unaware of their exposure.

Strategic Ambiguity and Future Risk

The Red Sea is no longer a stable trade corridor, but a zone of strategic ambiguity and asymmetric threat. Traditional risk mitigation strategies focused on ownership and destination are now insufficient. Operators must assess a broader set of variables, including historical route data and fleet affiliations, to gauge exposure.

As the Houthis signal continued intent to enforce their anti-Israel naval campaign, the Red Sea has become a high-stakes theater where commercial vessels, regardless of current affiliation, can no longer assume safety.